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bumpers or cleats, a glass jar within which sulphuric acid 
is transported. The injuries took place when in some 
manner the carboy broke, causing acid to come in contact 
with plaintiff's bodyo 
STATE~1ENT OF FACTS 
For a period of several years prior to July 28, 1958 
defendant had been purchasing chemically pure (CP) 
Sulphuric Acid from General Chemical Division of Allied 
Chemical and Dye Corporation (Tr. 191). This acid was 
delivered packaged in several ways (Tr. 226). One of the 
methods of packaging was in a container known as a 
carboy. A carboy consists of a wooden box or frame 
which surrounds and encases a six and one-half gallon 
machine blown glass jar or bottle. The glass jar or bottle 
is supported at the top and bottom of its main body by 
rubber buffers or cleats which are in turn supported by 
the corner posts of the wooden box. The sides and bottom 
of the glass jar are separated from the sides and bottom 
of the wooden box by an air space (Tr. 216, 217, 155, 156, 
158, Exhibit No. 3). 
Also, for a period of several years defendant had 
been selling to General Mills at its Ogden Plant, chemi-
cally pure sulphuric acid in carboys and had been deliver-
ing same to the plant where the carboys and acid were 
stored in the basement (Tr. 6, 7, 42). 
Plaintiff was a laboratory technician engaged in the 
conducting of various tests on grain as an employee of 
General Mills at its Ogden Plant and had been so em-
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ployed for approximately fourteen and one-half years 
prior to the occurrance from which this action arose ( Tr. 
4, 38). The accident occurred on July 28, 1958 in the 
basement of one of the buildings at the General Mills 
Plant and in the area where the carboys and sulphuric-
acid were stored. 
The last delivery of sulphuric acid made by defend-
ant prior to the accident was made on May 16, 1958 (Tr. 
47, 222), and neither defendants nor any of its employees 
had any opportunity to see, observe, inspect or examine~ 
or in any way deal with the carboys containing the sul-
phuric acid from that date until the date of the accident .. 
It is possible that the carboy. in question was delivered 
prior to May 16, 1958, but it is not possible that it was 
delivered later than that date, and it was therefore in the 
complete care, custody and control of General Mills and 
its employees from May 16, 1958 to July 28, 1958, the-
date of the accident (Tr.15, 48). 
On July 28, 1958, plaintiff, accompanied by a fellow 
laboratory employee, Jack Winters, went from the labora-
tory on the second floor to the basement for the purpose 
of carrying a carboy full of acid back to the laboratory 
to replace an empty one (Tr.10, 11). It was their custom 
to carry the carboy by means of a litter type device which 
consisted of two long rails which clamped underneath 
the flanges of the wooden box. They pulled the carboy 
involved in this accident out from its place in the corner~ 
affixed the carrying device by tightening up the bolts 
and clamping the rails underneath the flanges on the 
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sides of the wooden box. Winters stepped between the 
rails at the front and the plaintiff between the rails at 
the back and they proceeded to lift the carboy directly 
upward from the floor (Tr. 11, 45). The bottom of the 
carboy had reached a height of approximately one foot 
to eighteen inches from the floor when in some manner 
the bottom of the carboy, or part thereof, and the glass 
jar, or part thereof, together with the acid fell to the 
floor (Tr. 11, 37). Some of the acid splashed on plain~ 
tiff's feet and ankles, causing a burning sensation. He 
attempted to make his way to the wash room to wash 
the acid off with water and while endeavoring to do so 
slipped and fell down in the acid, causing the acid to come 
in contact with other parts of his body and resulting 
in burning to those areas as well as his feet and ankles. 
The carboy, including the wooden frame and the 
glass jar, was built in accordance with specifications set 
forth in Interstate Commerce Commission Regulations 
which strictly specify all details of construction (Tr. 41, 
154, 155, Exhibit 131). It was at all times the property 
of General Chemical Division of Allied Chemical and Dye 
Corporation (Tr.155, 156, 174, 190). It was in the posses-
sion of defendant and of General Mills only as a means 
of containing and transporting the sulphuric acid which 
had been purchased by defendant from Allied Chemical 
and Dye Corporation and in turn sold by defendant to 
General Mills, the employer of plaintiff in this case. Title 
to the carboy at no time passed from Allied Chemical and 
Dye Corporation to any other person, or corporation (Tr. 
189, 190, 197, 198). The carboy was filled with the acid 
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at Denver by Allied .Chemical and Dye Corporation, was 
shipped and transported in its filled condition to defend-
ant at Salt Lake City (Tr. 191). Defendant in turn trans-
ported it to the plant of General Mills at Ogden where 
it was placed in the basement of a building at that plant 
and when it remained in its filled condition in the 
custody of General Mills until the time of the accident 
in question. The carboy was inspected outwardly, as 
were all containers, when it was handled at the plant oi 
Wasatch Chemical Company, the defendant, in Salt Lake 
City, and there is no evidence that its appearance was 
other than that of a sound, adequate, properly constructed 
and properly maintained carboy, either at the time of its 
receipt in Salt Lake City by defendant, or at the time of 
its delivery to the premises of General Mills at Ogden, 
and, in fact, there is no evidence of any discoverable or 
discernable defect in the carboy in any way, or at any of 
the times covered by the evidence in this case ( Tr. 141, 
143, 163, 175, 176, 177, 198, 199). 
Counsel for defendant moved for a non-suit or dis-
missal with prejudice of plaintiff's action at the close of 
plaintiff's evidence and for a directed verdict after both 
parties had rested, both of such motions being denied by 
the trial court (Tr. 125, 234). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PROPERLY 
INSTRUCT THE JURY AND IN ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCT-
ING AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW RELATIVE TO DE-
FENDANT AND APPELLANT'S DUTY AS A SELLER. 
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POINT II. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN IMPROPERLY IN-
STRUCTING THE JURY RELATIVE TO THE ISSUE OF 
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT'S CONTRIBUTORY NEG-
LIGENCE. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE ·COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DIS-
MISSAL AT THE CLOSE OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPOND-
ENT'S CASE, AND DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT'S MO-
TION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AFTER BOTH PARTIES 
HAD RESTED. 
POINT IV. 
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT RESERVES THE FIL-
ING OF A REPLY BRIEF ON THE POINTS RAISED BY 
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT IN HIS CROSS APPEAL 
ON WHICH HIS BRIEF HAS NOT BEEN FILED AS OF 
THIS TIME. 
.A.RGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PROPERLY 
INS'TRUCT THE JURY AND IN ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCT-
ING AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW RELATIVE TO DE-
FENDANT AND APPELLANT'S DUTY AS A SELLER. 
Plaintiff's cause of action in this case sounded in two 
counts, the first count being in Tort based upon alleged 
negligence on the part of defendant, and the second 
count being in Contract based upon breach of warranty 
on the part of the defendant. 
At the close of the evidence, counsel for defendant 
moved for a directed verdict on plaintiff's complaint of 
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no cause of action and also moved to strike the first count 
of plaintiff's complaint which sounded in Tort. (Tr. 234) 
The Court granted the motion as to the first count and 
submitted the case to the jury on the basis of the second 
count sounding in Contract on the matter of W arrantyo 
(Tr. 234) The Court thus undertook the burden of in-
structing the jury with respect to the law as it applied -
to the question of the alleged breach of warranty on the-
part of the defendant and on the issue of contributory 
negligence on the part of plaintiff. The latter issue is dis- _ 
cussed under Point II of this brief. 
The Court refused to grant Defendant's Requested 
Instructions Numbers One, Four, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, 
Nine, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, Thirteen, Fourteen, Fifteen, _ 
and Sixteen, and counsel for defendant excepted to this 
refusal (Tr. 238). It is the contention of defendant and 
appellant that the Court erred in several particulars in 
both the instructions given and in the refusal of defend- -
ant's requested instructions. Defendant's Requested In-
struction Number One read as follows: 
"You are instructed to return a verdict in 
favor of defendant and against plaintiff, no cause _ 
of action." 
This, of course is tantamount to a directed verdict 
and based upon the applicable authorities which are cited 
hereafter, it is the contention of defendant and appellant-
that the case should not have been submitted to the jury 
on the question of warranty since no warranty of condi-
tion of the carboy, which was merely a container and 
means of transporting the acid which was the subject _ 
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matter of the sale, was ever made nor brought into effect 
by operation of law on the part of defendant and appel-
lant. This subject matter was also covered by Defend-
ant's Requested Instruction Number Eight which reads 
as follows: 
"You are instructed that defendant had no 
duty to inspect the carboy which was involved in 
this case, and therefore, unless you find the car-
boy was made unsafe by some act of the defendant 
you must return a verdict in favor of defendant 
and against plaintiff." 
Defendant's duty as to inspection was spelled out 
in Defendant's Requested Instructions Number Nine and 
Eleven. Requested Instruction Number Nine reads as 
follows: 
"You are instructed that defendant had no 
duty to make a rigid inspection of the carboy in-
volved in this case or to test it to determine its 
strength and condition. Defendant's only duty is 
to reasonably observe the outwardly apparent 
condition of the carboy and to remedy any defects 
which would be visible on such observation. 
You are further instructed that plaintiff had 
the same duty to observe the condition of the car-
boy." 
Deefndant's Requested Instruction Number Eleven 
reads as follows: 
"You are instructed that if you find the acid 
involved in this case was spilled because of a hid-
den defect in the carboy which would be discover-
able only by testing, you must return a verdict 
against plaintiff and in favor of defendant." 
10 
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It is conceded that some authorities hold there is a 
duty to make a reasonable inspection on the part of 
seller, while other authorities hold in a situation such as 
this where the container itself is not the subject of the 
sale, that the seller has no duty to even inspect. The 
former situation is covered by Instructions Number Nine 
and Eleven as requested, and the latter situation is cov- -
ered by Instruction Number Eight as requested. An 
essential element in any case is that the defect must be 
reasonably discernable or discoverable in the exercise of _ 
reasonable care and inspection on the part of the seller. 
In no event should the seller be held responsible for a 
hidden or latent defect and there is absolutely no evidence 
of any discoverable defect in this case. It is to be noted 
that the seller is neither the owner nor the manufacturer p 
of the carboy involved in this accident. The sale actually 
involves only the sale of a certain quantity of chemically 
pure sulphuric acid from defendants to plaintiff's em- _ 
ployer in a container which experience had shown to be 
of a safe type of construction. (Tr. 161, 163) 
From these facts it is evident that the duty of de-
fendant must be even less than the duty of a manu-
facturer. The manufacturer, of course, in this case is 
Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation. 
The Court's attention is directed to Restatement of 
the Law of Torts, Section 402, at Page 716, 1948 Supple- -
ment, which reads as follows: 
"ABSENCE OF DUTY TO INSPECT 
CHATTEL. A Vendor of a chattel manufactured 
by a third person, who neither knows nor has _ 
11 
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reason to know that it is, or is likely to be, danger. 
ous, is not subject to liability for harm caused· by 
the dangerous character or condition of the chat. 
tel even though he could have discov-ered it by 
an inspection or test of the chattel before selling 
it." 
Also found in Restatement of the Law of Torts, 1948 
Supplement, Section 402, Page 717 is the following state-
ment: 
"b. ·There is a clear distinction between the 
liability of a manufacturer and that of a vendor 
for harm caused by a chattel made by the former 
and sold by the latter. The manufacturer of a 
dangerously defective chattel is the creator of 
something which is forseeably dangerous when it 
is used for the purpose for which it is manu-
factured. The constructing of the chattel de-
fectively, with knowledge it is to be sent out to be 
used, is an unreasonably dangerous activity. On 
the other hand, the vendor who reasonably be-
lieves that the chattel he is selling is safe for use 
is not, in selhng and delivering the chattel, doing 
anything which i.s foreseeably likely to cause harm. 
The slight risk ~nherent in the possibility the 
chattel may be defective is not sufficient to con-
stitute an unreasonable risk. The burden on the 
vendor of requiring him to ~nspect chattels he 
reasonably believes to be free from hidden dange·r 
outweighs the magnitude of the risk that a par-
ticular chattel may be dangerously defective (See 
Sec. 291-293). Negligence is determined in the 
light of the facts known to the actor. (See Sec. 
282, Comment g)." (Italics added.) 
It is to be noted that defendant, the seller in this 
case, relied not only upon the generally good and reliable 
12 
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reputation of the manufacturer, Allied Chemical and Dye 
Corporation, but also upon the stringent requirements. 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission regulations. (Tr. 
161, 162, 192) There is no evidence that the carboy in 
question showed any discoverable defects at any of the 
times involved in this case and in fact, all evidence is that 
its outward appearance indicated it to be alright. 
The Court's attention is directed to pages 718, 71!1 
and 720 of the same section of the Restatement of Torts 
where the small minority of cases which do not follow 
the general rule are discussed and scathingly criticized 
and the text quotes with favor the great majority of au-
thorities in support of defendant's position herein. The 
applicable ICC Regulations to which we have aluded here-
in are as follows: 
"78.4-1 Compliance. (a) Required in all de-
tails. 
78.4-4 (b) Marking. Each carboy bottle must 
be permanently marked in bottom as follows : 
Maker's mark (to be registered with Bureau 
of Explosives) 
Year of Manufacture 
ICC-ID 
"78-4-5 Glass carboy bottle. (a) Must be 
machine-blown, thoroughly and properly annealed, 
with screw thread finish having at least one con-
tinuous thread to accommodate closure; top of lip 
smooth and even; must contain 14 pounds of glass, 
tolerance minus 8 ounces plus 16 ounces. Mini-
mum thickness to be .075 inch. Defective carboys 
not authorized. 
13 
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"78.4-6 Outside containers. (a) Wooden 
boxes completely enclosing body and neck of car-
boy, with 4 vertical corner posts, two cleats for 
shoes and two carrying cleats. An opening not 
exceeding 3 inches in width may be provided 
directly above the neck of bottle, if the top of the 
box is made up of not more than two pieces of 
lumber of 25 j32 inch thickness. Bottom board of 
the two ends of the box must be constructed of 
lumber at least one inch thick, must be flush with 
the carrying cleats and be at least 23;4 inches in 
width. Cleats or other fasteners used to secure 
cover must not extend beyond carrying cleats. 
(b) Lumber to be well seasoned, commer-
cially dry, and free from decay, loose knots, knots 
that would interfere with nailing, and other de-
fects that would materially lessen the strength. 
(c) Assemble sides and ends with grain of 
wood horizontal and nail as specified. Nail bottom 
to sides and ends ; fasten top by any efficient 
means. Cleats for shoes to be along edges of 
bottom parallel to carrying cleats and at right 
angle to the direction of bottom board or boards. 
"78.-4-8 Tests-( a) Apparatus. Standard re-
quired. Detail prints can be obtained from Bureau 
of Explosives, 30 Vesey Street, New York 7, N.Y. 
(b) Method. Fill with water to lower edge 
of neck; swing 55" measured from wall to nearest 
bottom edge of basket : 
( 1) Side shock; test at least 10 carboys. 
(2) Bottom shock, test at least 5 carboys. 
(c) Acceptable results. 90 percent of car-
boys must not break under side shock; same for 
bottom shock. 
14 
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(d) When required. By each manufacturing 
and each filling plant; during each 6 months of 
each year, one series each year to be witnessed by -
representative of Bureau of Explosives; separate 
tests required for~ 
(1) New package (those with new outside 
container). 
( 2) Used packages. 
( 3) Packages differing in kind of cush= 
ioning." 
All of these regulations apply to Allied Chemical & 
Dye Corporation, the manufacturer, not to defendant who 
is only a vendor of the acid (Tr. 156, 160). 
Thus, Defendant was entitled to rely not only on 
the good reputation of its supplier, but also on the double 
safeguard of the stringent construction and testing re= ~ 
quirements of the ICC Regulations which govern persons 
or corporations that own and fill such carboys. 
The following holding is found in Witt Ice a'Yld Gas -
Company v. Bedway, 1951.Arizona, 231 P. 2nd 952, where 
the Court said~ 
"A wholesale or retail dealer, who sells in 
their original packages goods brought from repu- _ 
table manufacturers, acts as a conduit through 
which the goods pass from manufacturer to con-
sumer, who buys them in reliance upon the manu= 
facturer's reputation for competence and care . .A 
vendor of such goods, therefore, is under no duty -
to subject them to rigid inspection or tests before 
selling them." 
While it is clear that the manufacturer has some duty 
of inspection, the rule of H ewit v. General Tire and Rub-
15 
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ber Company (Utah 1955) .3 Utah 2d, 354, 284 P. 2d 471, 
holds that mere proof of an injury will not justify a 
verdict or judgment imposing liability upon a manu-
facturer and if the evidence does not show any negligence 
on the part of the manufacturer, there can be no recovery 
regardless of the fact that the injured person was not 
negligent. Certainly, defendant's duty as the seller is not 
as great as the duty of the manufacturer and even under 
the manufacturer rule, defendant could not be held in 
warranty i_n this case. 
The Hewitt case follows the law as set forth in a 
prior Utah case, Hooper v. General Motors Corporati·on, 
260 P. 2d 551, which says: 
"Thus, to impose liability on an assembler of 
an automobile, certain necessary elements must 
be made out. Plaintiff is required to show: (1) A 
defective wheel at the time of automobile assem-
bly; ( 2 ) Such defects being discoverable by rea-
sonable inspection; (3) Injury caused by failure 
of the wheel due to its defective condition." 
It is to be noted that there is absolutely no evidence 
on just what sort of defect did exist in the carboy at or 
immediately prior to the happening of the accident from 
which this action arises. There is certainly no evidence 
that there was any discoverable defect and there is ample 
evidence that defendant, through its employees, made 
reasonable inspection of this and all carboys, both in its 
Sat Lake Plant and in the course of delivery, and that no 
defect was observed prior to the time that the carboy 
was deposited in the building of General Mills in Ogden, 
16 
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Utah. In fact, the carboy withstood shipment from Den-
ver to Salt Lake by truck (Tr. 191) unloading at the Salt 
Lake Plant of defendant, reloading onto the truck of 
defendant at the Salt Lake Plant (Tr. 175 ), transporta-
tion by truck with no padding or other means of pre-
venting the normal jarring of riding in a truck between 
Salt Lake and Ogden, unloading at Ogden and placing 
on a two-wheeled hand truck by defendant's employee, 
and bumping down a flight of stairs to the basement by 
means of being lowered from step to step on the two-
wheel hand truck in the process of delivery by defend-
ant's employee. (Tr. 138, 139) Throughout all of this the-
carboy remained in tact and the acid remained within its 
container. Certainly if there was a defect which would 
have been discoverable by Defendant it would have -
showed up and been discovered in the course of such 
handling. However, after remaining in the basement of 
the General Mills building for approximately two and _ 
one-half months with no evidence of leakage the carboy 
was simply slid a distance of a iew feet across the floor 
and was then lifted directly up some twelve to eighteen 
inches at which point it gave way. Now here in the Court's 
instructions is the matter of "such defects being discover-
able by reasonable inspection" treated or discussed. In 
fact, in Instruction Number Eight the Court instructed 
the jury as follows: 
"Mr. Palmer has not only the burden of prov-
ing that the defect was present at the time of de-
livery, but also that the defect was a 'substantial 
defect.' A substantial defect in this case is defined 
as one that rendered the package so unsafe that -
17 
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a reasonably prudent person, exercising ordinary 
care for the safety of others would not have deQ 
livered a package with such a defect, or would 
have specifically warned the receiver of the pres~ 
ence of the . defect. Also, it must have been such 
a defect that its delivery would have been with-
held or warned of because a reasonably prudent 
person exercising ordinary care for the safety of 
others would have foreseen the risk of an incident 
of the general type of the incident alleged by Mr. 
Palmer." 
There is no evidence that defendant knew of the 
defect and there is no evidence that defendant could have 
known of the defect in the exercise of reasonable care or 
ordinary inspection of the carboy. Thus, under the 
Court's instructions the defendant is placed in the posi-
tion of being a ·virtually absolute insurer of plaintiff's 
well being, despite the fact that defendant could reason~ 
ably have done nothing to guard against the mishap which 
occurred. 
A similar question is involved in the Federal case of 
Burgess v. Montgomery Ward and Company, 264 F2d 
495 (lOth Cir. Kan. 1959), which holds ~ 
"In a case such as that now before us it is 
completely unreasonable to expect the shopkeeper 
to perform the inspection or test which would 
have revealed to an expert the defect in the ladder 
rail. (Defendant) is operating a retail store, not a 
testing laboratory." 
A similar rule is established in Willey v. Fyrogas 251 
SW 2d 635 ( 1952 Mo.). 
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The Utah case of Matievitch v. Hercules Powder 
Company, 3 Utah 2d, 283, 282 P.2d 1044, is a case involv-
ing explosion of dynamite, which holds that there is n() 
absolute liability or insurability on the part of a manu-
facturer of explosives. Again it is noted that the burden 
certainly is greater upon a manufacturer than it is upon 
a seller in the position of defendant in this case. If there 
was a defect in the carboy prior to or at the time of its 
delivery, not later than May 16, 1958 by defendant, such 
defect was hidden and not discernable to defendant unless 
exhaustive laboratory type tests were conducted. De-
fendant certainly does not have the duty to conduct such 
tests. 
The California case of Simmons v. Rhodes and 
Jamieson, Ltd., 293 P .2d 26, says : 
"In absence of evidence of feasible means of 
discovering defects or danger in commodity sold, 
seller is not liable for an injury resulting from 
the use of the commodity." 
The Utah case of Winchester v. Egan Farm Service, 
4 Utah 2d 129, 288 P. 2d 790, involving a seller of farm 
machinery who also did assembling of the machinery 
says: 
"Where the implement dealer asembled ma-
chinery according to the manufacturer's design 
and instructions, the fact that a bolt of a different 
size might have fit better did not place the re-
sponsibility or duty on the implement dealer to 
place such bolt thereon and did not maKe the 
dealer liable to purchaser for injuries suffered 
when lever unlocked and struck purchaser in the 
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face as dealer had no obligation to redesign ma-
chinery." 
The recent Washington case of Smith v . .American 
Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 266 P. 2d 792 goes even one step 
further in holding that: 
"One selling a chattel, manufactured by an-
other, without knowledge or reason to know that 
it is or is likely to be dangerous, is not liable for 
harm caused by its dangerous character or condi-
tion, though he could have discovered danger by 
inspection or tests of chattel before selling it." 
The evidence in this case is that carboys of the type 
involved, constructed under rigid government specifica-
tions and tested in accordance with government require-
ments, have been proven by long use to be safe containers. 
In fact, the evidence introduced by experts on behalf of 
defendant indicates that despite long experience these 
experts had never seen the bottom fall completely out of 
a carboy. (Tr. 163) 
A further ground for the granting of Defendant's 
Requested Instruction Number One is the lack of privity 
between defendant and plaintiff. The contract for sale 
of the acid was between defendant and General Mills, 
Incorporated, plaintiff being a laboratory employee of 
the latter. The general rule on this point is found in 
American Jurisprudence, Sales, Sec. 810 p. 934. 
"Liability to Remote Buyer or Other Third 
Person General Warranty- Liability of Seller. 
It has been held that the buyer's tenant, the buy-
er's employee, or a member of the buyer's family 
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who is injured through the article sold cannot base 
his action against the seller on an express or im-
plied warranty." 
Cited in support of this statement with respect to 
"the buyer's employee" is the case of Berger v. Standard 
Oil Company, 126 Ky. 155, 103 S.W. 245, which says: 
"A warranty is always a matter of contract~ 
For its breach, damages may be recovered by any 
party to the contract injured thereby, including 
any person for whose benefit the contract is made~ 
but strangers to the contract have no right of ac-
tion upon it. There is lacking privity, mutuality,. 
consideration and every other element essential 
to constitute the contractual relation between the 
claimant and the person sued." 
Thus, while defendant does not concede that there 
was any warranty of the carboy by defendant to anyone, 
it is also argued that even had there been such a war-
ranty, such warranty could not inure to the benefit of 
plaintiff in this case. 
46 Am. J ur. Sales, Sec. 306, 487 
"Liability of seller to third persons. The fact 
that a seller warrants the condition or quality of a 
thing sold does not itself, according to one view, 
impose any liability on him to third persons who 
are in no way parties to the contract. In such a 
case there is no privity of contract between the 
seller and the third persons and this precludes any 
right on their part to any advantage or benefit 
to be derived from the warranty. There is author-
ity to the effect that there can be no implied war-
ranty without privity of contract and it has been 
held that a manufacturer is not liable for breach 
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of warranty to third persons who are strangers 
to the c-ontract of manufacturer or sales for the 
results of any defects which may later develop in 
his product." 
Numerous cases are cited in support of this state-
ment and the Court's attention is directed to the footo 
notes under numbers sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, nine-
teen and twenty, found on pages 487 and 488 of Vol. 46 of 
Am. Jur. 
There are a number of cases in point and supporting 
the general rule requiring privity. Following are some 
of these cases and their holdings. 
Wood, et al v. General Electric Co., et al.,, 159 Ohio 
273, 112 N.E. 2d 8 (1953) 
"Although a subpurchaser of an inherently 
dangerous article may recover from its manu-
facturer for negligence in the making and furnish-
ing of the article, causing harm to the sub-
purchaser or his property from a latent defect 
therein, no action may . be maintained against a 
manufacturer for injury, based upon implied war-
ranty or fitness of the article so furnished." 
Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz. 
163, 317 P. 2d 1094 (1958): 
"A a general rule, no implied warranty inures 
in absence of privity of contract; but in the case 
of food, beverages and drugs, on implied warranty 
by the manufacturer that goods are pure and free 
from deleterious foreign substances inures to 
benefit of ultimate consumer of those goods, by 
operation of law even in the absence of privity 
of contract." 
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Odell v. Frueh, 146 Cal. App. 2d 504, 304 P. 2d 45 
(1957) : 
"The seller of goods other than food stuffs 
is bound by his unadvertised warranty only t() 
parties with whom he is contractually obligated.'" 
Collum v. Pope and Talbot, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 2d 
653, 288 P.2d 75 (1956) : 
"Exceptions to general rule that privity of 
contract is required in action for breach of either-
express or implied warranty have been made in 
cases involving food stuffs and a few cases where 
purchaser of a product relied on representations 
made by manufacturer on labels or advertising 
material." 
Burr v. Sherwivrt Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 
P.2d 1041 (1954) : 
"Generally, privity of contract is required in 
an action for breach of either express or implied 
warranty, and there is no privity between the 
original seller and a subsequent purchaser who is -
in no way a party to the original sale." 
Abercrombie v. Union Portland Cement Co., 35 Id. 
231, 205 p. 1118 ( 1922) : 
"The general rule, to which there are certain -
well established exceptions is that a manufacturer 
or vendor of an article is not liable to any person, 
other than the immediate purchaser of such article 
because of defect therein." 
Burgner-Bowman Lumber Co. v. McCord- Kestler 
Mercantrle Co., 114 Kan. 10, 216 P. 815 (1923) 
A contractor engaged in construction of a building 
ordered from plaintiff, a dealer, some Portland Cement . 
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for purpose of constructing a hard surfaced concrete 
floor. He advised plaintiff of the purpose for which it 
was wanted and requested Portland Cement. Plaintiff 
delivered the cement which was of poor and inferior 
quality which caused the floors to check, crack and dis-
integrate. 
The Court held doctrine of caveat emptor has no 
application and that there was an implied warranty of 
quality. 
In the same action to recover for the price of the 
cement and to establish a mechanic's lien, a cross petition 
was filed by the owner of the building who sought to re-
cover for damage to the building caused by the defective 
cement. 
The ·Court held that as there was no contractual 
relations between the dealer and the owner of the building 
the trial court properly denied the owner the right to 
recover damages. 
Miller v. Hand Ford Sales, Inc., 340 P.2d 181 (Ore. 
1959): 
"The theory of breach of an implied warranty 
arises only out of privity of contract." 
Cockran v. McDonald, 23 Wash. 2d 348, 161 P.2d 305 
(1947): 
"A dealer is not liable on express warranty 
of a manufacturer which is put out with or attach-
ed to goods manufactured unless the dealer adopts 
warranty and makes it his own when selling goods 
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to another, and mere sales does not adopt war-
ranty as dealer's own. 
"The whole saler was not liable to buyer of · 
anti-freeze on express warranty which manu-
facturer had affixed to container of anti-freeze.'' 
Dobbin v. Pacific Coast Coal Company, 170 P. 2d 
642 (1947): 
A purchaser of new house with faulty furnace which 
was sold by distributor to retailer who installed the 
furnace for builder before house was sold, could not re-
cover against distributor, retailer or builder on theory -
of breach of warranty express or implied or any other 
contractual theory, since there was no privity between 
purchaser and any of defendants. 
The Court further erred with resulting prejudice to -
defendant in Insthuction Number Three which reads in 
part as follows: 
"General Mills bought from Wasatch Chemi-
cal ·Company acid. The law implies in their agree- -
ment not only that the acid would be as specified 
but also that it would be delivered in a reason-
ably safe container. The law also implies that 
the duty to deliver in a reasonably safe container 
runs not only to General Mills, but also to Gen- -
eral l\1ills employees who ·would reasonably be 
expected to handle the container." 
The third sentence of this instruction is in error on 
the basis of the authorities cited above. The second sen- -
tence is in error on the basis of the authorities dealing 
with the matter of warranty and the duties of defendant 
with respect to the container which have been previously 
cited. 
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Instruction Number Three is also erroneous and 
prejudicial in its fourth paragraph which reads as 
follows: 
"The defendant alleges that all of the contain-
ers they delivered were reasonably safe, therefore 
they have not breached their contract and are not 
liable for any damages." 
This is only a part of defendant's position and de-
fendant also specifically alleged and argued to the Court 
that defendant had no duty or obligation to see to the 
safeness or condition of the containers and certainly had 
no obligation or duty to test them to discover latent or 
hidden defects. 
Instruction Number Four of the Court is erroneous 
in that it places a burden upon defendant to deliver a 
container which would "be sufficiently safe to withstand 
reasonable handling." 
Instruction Number Six given by the Court is also 
erroneous and prejudicial as it improperly states the 
law with respect to the duties of defendant relative to the 
carboy and its condition. 
Instruction Number Seven is erroneous and preju-
dicial as it improperly states the law and further pro-
poses an illustration which infers a condition to have 
existed on which there is absolutely no evidence, and 
which inference is prejudicial to defendant. 
The instruction in this regard says : 
"Such as if acid was present and attacking the 
carboy when delivered, but did not sufficiently 
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weaken the carboy to make it unsafe until after it 
had acted for a time at the General Mills place." 
There is absolutely no evidence that any acid was 
present except as contained within the glass jar at the 
time of delivery and the evidence is clear that if acid were 
spilled within the container its action would be complete 
within a matter of hours. 
It must be concluded from the foregoing that the 
Court erroneously and improperly instructed the jury 
and that the defendant's position was prejudiced by such _ 
instruction. 
POINT II. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN IMPROPERLY IN~ 
STRUCTING THE JURY RELATIVE TO THE ISSUE OF 
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT'S CONTRIBUTORY NEG~ 
LIGENCE. 
It is clear from the pleadings and the record in this 
case that one of the issues of fact which was always be-
fore the court and which was submitted in a somewhat -
round about way to the jury was the issue of contributory 
negligence on the part of plaintiff. It certainly must be 
conceded that if the jury had found, under Instruction 
Number Four, that the plaintiff was raising the container _ 
in other than a reasonably prudent manner when the 
incident occurred the verdict would have had to be no 
cause of action in favor of defendant. 
However, in Instruction Number Three, the Court · 
failed completely to instruct the jury with respect to the 
defendant's contention that plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent. Instruction Number Four as given by the 
Court relates only to the manner of handling of th~ 
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carboy by plaintiff, but does not instruct the jury upon 
the duty of plaintiff to exercise reasonable care and to 
make a reasonable inspection of the carboy to ascertain 
whether there were any discernable defects or evident 
damage which would render it unsafe to handle. It is 
again noted that the plaintiff was an expert in dealing 
with substances such as the sulphuric acid contained in 
the carboy, being a trained laboratory technician who 
had been engaged as a technician for fourteen and one-
half years by General :Mills. The matter of negligence 
was covered by Defendant's Requested Instruction Num-
ber Six which read: 
"Negligence is the failure to do what a reason-
able and prudent person would have done under 
the circumstances, or doing what such person un-
der such circumstances would not have done. The 
fault may lie in acting or in omitting to act." 
Contributory negligence was covered by Defendant's 
Requested Instruction Number Seven : 
"Contributory negligence is negligence on the 
part of a person injured which, cooperating with 
the negligence of another, assists in proximately 
causing his own injury. 
"One who is guilty of contributory negligence 
may not recover from another for any injury suf-
fered because if both parties were at fault in negli-
gently causing an injury the degree of negligence 
cannot be weighed by the jury." 
Defendant's Requested Instruction Number Ten also 
dealt with the degree of care to which plaintiff was held. 
It read: 
"You are instructed that the plaintiff had a 
duty to use reasonable care for his own safety. 
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If you find that he did not exercise such ca:re in 
the handling of the carboy involved in this case 
and that his failure to exercise reasonable care -
contributed to the accident and his injuries, you 
must return a verdict against the plaintiff and 
in favor of the defendant." 
The instructions of the Court are insufficient in 
their definition of the terms of negligence, contributory -
negligence and the burden or duty of care placed upon 
plaintiff, and are also prejudicial to defendant in that 
they do not submit the issue as raised and involving all p 
elements of handling the container by plaintiff, particu-
larly in view of his special training and experience. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE ·COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DISD p 
MISSAL AT THE CLOSE OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPOND-
ENT'S CASE, AND DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT'S MO-
TION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AFTER BOTH PARTIES 
HAD RESTED. 
It is clear from the transcript that the Court sub-
mitted this case to the jury under plaintiff's second count 
and on the question of breach of warranty only. It is 
contended by defendant and appellant that there was no _ 
privity between defendant and plaintiff in this case and 
that thus plaintiff could not be the beneficiary of any 
warranty, express or implied if such existed. Further, 
that there was no warranty of the carboy, which was -
merely a container, running from defendant to General 
Mills. The only warranty to which defendant could be 
held as a vendor would be that the goods (that is the 
chemically pure sulphuric acid) would be suitable for the . 
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purpose for which they were intended. The carboy was 
never a part of any sale and in fact title to the carboy 
remained at all times in Allied Chemical and Dye Corpo-
ration. 
The authorities relating to defendant's position as a 
vendor and on the question of whether or not defendant 
could be held to any warranty express or implied with 
respect to the carboy, have been set forth and discussed 
under Point I of this brief. 
The evidence is clear that there was no discernable 
or discoverable defect in the carboy and the evidence is 
also clear that defendant, through its employer made 
reasonable inspections of this carboy as well as all car-
boys which pa~sed through its hands prior to and at the 
time of delivery of such carboys. Defendant cannot be 
held to be an absolute insurer of plaintiff's well being 
and cannot be held on a theory of virtually absolute lia-
bility for a latent or hidden defect in the carboy if such 
defect results in injury to plaintiff. If any such duty ex-
ists that duty must be on the part of the manufacturer, 
Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation, and not upon 
defendant in this case. This position is further supported 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission Regulations 
cited herein which place the duty of compliance with 
construction requirements and of compliance with strict 
testing requirements on the owner and manufacturer, 
that is Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation. Since the 
only basis on which defendant could be held liable was 
that of warranty, and since under the applicable law 
no warranty existed, it is contended that the Court erred 
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in submitting the case to the jury and in failing to grant 
defendant's motions for dismissal and directed verdict 
in its favor. 
POINT IV. 
DE·FENDANT AND APPELLANT RESERVES THE FIL-
ING OF A REPLY BRIEF ON THE POINTS RAISED BY 
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT IN HIS CROSS APPEAL -
ON WHICH HIS BRIEF HAS NOT BEEN FILED AS OF 
THIS TIME. 
Defendant and appellant has received notice of cross 
appeal from counsel for plaintiff and respondent notify-
ing that the plaintiff and respondent cross appeals from 
the order of the District ·Court, Honorable John F. Wahl-
quist, Judge thereof, granting defendant's motion t(} 
dismiss plaintiff's first count and in withdrawing from 
the jury any and all matters set forth and alleged in the 
first count wherein plaintiff sought to recover judgment 
against the defendant on the theory of negligence. The 
Court found that there were insufficient facts to prove-
either negligence by specific testimony or under the-
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. (Tr. 234) Defendants con-
tends that this was a proper ruling and that it is sup-
ported by the record in this case. There is not sufficient 
evidence to eliminate the possibility under the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur of negligence on the part of the manu-
facturer Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation, prior to 
the time that the carboy in question was delivered to de- -
fendant in this case. There further is not sufficient evi-
dence to rule out the possibility of negligence on the part 
of some other person during the period of approximately 
two and one-half months that the carboy was in the ex- . 
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elusive, care, custody and control of General Mills, Inco 
at its Ogden plant between the last possible date of deG 
livery by defendant and the date of the accident in this 
case. Defendant and appellant therefore reserves the 
right to file a reply brief after receiving plaintiff and 
respondent's cross appeal brief on this point so that au-
thorities and further argument may be offered to the 
Court on this point. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument and authorities it 
appears clear that the Court erred with resulting 
prejudice to the defendant and appellant in failing to 
grant defendant and appellant's motion for dismissal 
and motion for directed verdict in favor of defendant 
and appellant, and further that the Court erred in im-
properly and erroneously instructing the jury on material 
issues and questions of law. 
It is, therefore, the conclusion of defendant and 
appellant that this Court should reverse the District 
Court and should find the issues in favor of defendant 
and appellant and direct a verdict of no cause of action, 
or in the alternative and without prejudice to the fore-
going conclusion it is urged that the Court should remand 
the matter for a new trial on the basis of the other errors 
assigned. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHARLIER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CARMAN E. KIPP 
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